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THE GREATEST HAPPINESS




A good society is one where people are as happy as pos-
sible, and as few as possible are miserable.That is what
many enlightened people believed in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries.The time has come to reassert
that humane philosophy and to put it into practice.
As I shall argue, the belief was always right. But it was
difficult to put it into practice because we knew so little
about the causes of happiness.Over the last thirty years,
however,we have learned a great deal,due to the explo-
sive growth in the new science of happiness. At the
same time it has become more imperative than ever to
focus on happiness as the objective of public policy.For
we have largely eliminated the obvious evils of absolute
poverty and premature death.But,despite rapid rises in
living standards, happiness has not risen over the last
fifty years in Britain, the US or West Germany. If we
want further rises in happiness, we need to focus seri-
ously on what really causes happiness and misery.
So I will begin by discussing the causes of happiness
and why it has not risen (see Layard (2005) and
Layard, Mayraz and Nickell (2010) for the evidence).
I shall then defend the greatest happiness principle
and show how it differs from the principles of laissez
faire economics.Finally I shall illustrate how it should
alter our priorities for public policy.
The causes of happiness
Happiness is an objective dimension of all our expe-
rience – like temperature. At every instant we feel
good or bad,on a scale that runs from the extremes of
misery to the utmost bliss. Our feeling good or bad is
affected by many factors running from physical com-
fort to our inner sense of meaning, and “pleasure and
pain” are not adequate terms for what we are talking
about. What matters is of course the totality of our
happiness over months and years.The science enables
us to measure this and to attempt to explain it.
To measure happiness we can ask a person how
happy he is – or we can ask his friends or indepen-
dent investigators.These reports are highly correlat-
ed. But the big breakthrough has been in neuro-
science. Researchers have identified an area in the
left front of the brain where good feelings are expe-
rienced, and another in the right front where bad
feelings are experienced.Activity in these brain areas
alters sharply when people have good or bad experi-
ences. And when we compare people, those who de-
scribe themselves as happy are more active on the left
side than unhappy people, and less active on the right
side. So the old behaviourist idea that we cannot
know how other people feel has at last been put back
in the dustbin where it belongs.
So, how are we doing? When Britons or Americans
are asked how happy they are, there is no improve-
ment in happiness over the last fifty years – nor do
the same individuals report themselves as happier
over time, though they are richer. Moreover, psychi-
atric surveys show that more people suffer from de-
pression, and crime is also significantly higher –
another indicator of dissatisfaction.These are devas-
tating facts that cannot be ignored.
What explains them? Why has happiness not increased
at the same time that living standards have risen so
sharply? And why in particular is there no increase in
happiness at the upper tail of the income distribution,
when income inequality has increased so much?
To answer these questions we have to look at the
causes of happiness. In every study, satisfaction with
family/personal life is the most important,in terms of
variance explained. Financial satisfaction generally
comes next, but this is not well correlated with in-
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come, for reasons I’ll explain. Then comes work –
whether you have work (if you want it) and whether
you like your work; this is followed by your satisfac-
tion with your community. And of course good
health and political freedom have big effects.
So how are we doing on these various causes? In-
comes are up, but there is little increase in financial
satisfaction.This is because people are to a large ex-
tent comparing their incomes with what others like
them are getting or with what they themselves have
got used to. If your comparator income is rising as
fast as your actual income, this blunts the gain in
happiness as actual incomes rise.
Moreover, as income rises, extra income brings less
extra happiness.The science of happiness enables us
to measure this effect – an extra £1 for a rich person
brings one-tenth as much extra happiness as it would
to a person one-tenth as rich (Layard, Mayraz and
Nickell 2008).So it is not surprising that the big rises
in upper incomes brings so little extra happiness.
I do however believe that over the last fifty years our
rise in living standards has had some positive effects
on our overall happiness. But this has been offset by
the negative effects of worsening human relation-
ships – more broken families,more pressure at work,
and less cohesive communities.
For most people a key determinant of happiness is
whether you feel that other people are on your side
– or alternatively that they are a threat. So we learn
a lot from how people reply to questions about trust.
A question often asked is “Would you say that most
people can be trusted – or would you say that you
can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” In Bri-
tain and the US the percentage who say “Yes, most
people can be trusted” has fallen from 55 percent in
1960 to under 35 percent today. By contrast in conti-
nental European countries, where data exist from
1980 only, trust has if anything been increasing.
Since human life began,senior citizens have lamented
a supposed decline of morals.But here is some further
evidence of a decline in the last fifty years.At various
times samples of Americans have been asked whether
they believe that people lead “as good lives – moral
and honest – as they used to”. In 1952, as many said
Yes as No. By 1998 three times as many said No.
The decline in trust is especially distressing when it
affects children.In a WHO survey of 11–15 year olds,
the children were asked whether they agreed that
“most of the students in my class(es) are kind and
helpful”.The percentage saying Yes were over 75 per-
cent in Sweden, Switzerland, and Germany, 53 per-
cent in the United States and under 46 percent in
Russia and England.
A key problem seems to be the growth of individu-
alism (stemming in particular from the US),the main
objective of which is to make the most of yourself –
which often means to do the best for yourself com-
pared with other people.This is a terrifying and lone-
ly objective. People do of course feel obligations to
other people as well, but these are not based on any
clear set of ideas. The old religious sanction is gone,
and so too is the post-war religion of social solidarity.
We are left with no clear concept of the common good.
We definitely need such a concept if we are to have
a cohesive society. And it has to be an ideal which
includes the welfare of all. If we had such a concept,
it would not only help us think about policy, but,
more important, it would motivate each citizen to
contribute to the good of others and to get satisfac-
tion from doing so.
The greatest happiness principle
So here is the concept we need:
• The common good consists in the happiness of all.
• The good society is one where people are as happy
as possible, and as few as possible are miserable.
• The right action (and the right policy) is the one
that produces the greatest happiness and, espe-
cially, the least misery.
This is of course what Bentham and many British
thinkers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
believed. I have added only one modification to
Bentham. I believe the relief of misery is more im-
portant than the promotion of great happiness So it is
more socially desirable to increase the happiness of a
miserable person than to increase by the same amount
the happiness of someone who is already happy.This is
an important change from Bentham’s view that all
that matters is the sum of happiness – so that extra
happiness is equally valuable whoever experiences it.
This “additive assumption”of Bentham’s has been fre-
quently used as an argument against his version of util-
itarianism – and rightly so.But it in no way invalidates
a modified version of utilitarianism in which society’s
welfare depends only on the happiness of the citizens,but with different weights for citizens at different
levels of happiness.1
But many people question the whole basis of an
approach that focuses on happiness. Sen (1992), Sen
and Williams (1982) and Nozick (1974), among oth-
ers,have made major criticisms.The main ones relate
to “other goods”, expediency, rights, agency, adapta-
tion and the nanny state.
Other goods
Why the greatest possible happiness? What is so spe-
cial about happiness? Why not the greatest possible
health, autonomy, accomplishment, and so on? The
answer is that happiness is the only experience that
is self-evidently good.If I ask you why health is good,
you can give reasons: people should not feel pain,
they should be able to function well,be of use to oth-
ers, and so on. Or, if asked why autonomy is good,
you will find reasons: people feel better when they
can control their lives. And so on. But if I ask you
why happiness is good, you can find no reason: you
will say that it’s self-evident. The reason for this is
deep in our biology. We are programmed to enjoy
experiences that are good for our survival, and that
is why we have survived.So the desire to be happy is
a completely central feature of our nature.
Fortunately, we have also been programmed in part
to have a sense of fairness.If a mean has to be divid-
ed, most of us accept (sometimes grudgingly) that it
should be divided 50:50 – on the basis that in princi-
ple others count as much as we do.
If you put this idea together with the fact that each of
us wants to be happy, you arrive at the Benthamite
principle.It is both idealistic and realistic.It puts others
on an equal footing with ourselves, where they should
be,but (unlike some moral systems) it also allows us to
take our own happiness into account as well.
Expediency
The second objection is that the rule is impractical
and encourages expediency. Not so.We all know we
cannot evaluate every action moment by moment
against the overall Benthamite principle.That is why
we have to have sub-rules, like honesty, promise-
keeping, kindness and so on, which we normally fol-
low as a matter of course and feel bad if we do not.
And that is also why we need clearly defined rights
embedded in a constitution. But when moral rules
come into conflict with each other (or legal rights
do), we need an overarching principle to guide us,
and this is what Bentham provides.
The rule is also criticised as putting ends before
means,by being consequentialist.This is a misconcep-
tion. If you take a decision, the consequences include
the whole sequence of feelings experienced by those
affected – those experienced during the action (the
means) as well as those that follow it (the ends). A
horrible action causing great pain would require
extraordinarily good (and certain) outcomes to justi-
fy it.Indeed it would normally hurt the feelings of the
author and he should be programmed to hate doing it.
Rights
Another objection to the principle is that it does not
start from human rights or desirable “capabilities”.
But how can we start there? If we start writing down
a list of human rights,any reasonable person will say,
why do you include this and not that? On what basis
do you make your selection? Why do these rights or
capabilities matter more than any others you might
include?A very reasonable answer is that some rights
or capabilities are more conducive to human happi-
ness than others. But then you are not starting from
rights, you are starting from happiness.
In his discussion of desirable capabilities, Sen ac-
knowledges the obvious problem of how we com-
pare the importance of advancing one set of capabil-
ities with another. He suggests that we choose the
weights by letting the population vote. But voting
must be preceded by rational debate. How would a
citizen decide how to cast his vote? He would surely
want to compare the relative importance of different
capabilities in contributing to some overall objective.
What more obvious objective than human happiness?
Moreover,political philosophy should be a sub-set of
moral philosophy. In a democracy, what people vote
for will reflect their general moral system.Those who
argue for a wide range of positive rights must explain
how the population can be induced to support them.
I doubt whether this is possible unless people feel
some general obligation or duty to promote the wel-
fare of their fellow citizens. So what we need is a
moral (and political philosophy) that starts from
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some general duty to promote the (weighted) happi-
ness of all, as best we can.
Agency
One important good,as I have said,is the sense of con-
trol over your life,and people generally enjoy a pound
they have earned more than one they have been given.
These are important truths which are often labelled as
the importance of “agency”.But they do not challenge
the principle of the greatest happiness.
What would challenge that principle would be the
assertion that, even if you sensed you had control,
that would not be enough – you need to have actual
control. Nozick has argued for that view via a fanci-
ful thought experiment. Imagine a machine, he says,
to which your inert body can be attached but which
can make you feel exactly as if you were leading a
normal active life. Would you plug in, says Nozick,
expecting the answer No. And if the answer is No,
says Nozick,this shows that feeling happy and active
is not enough – you actually have to do something.
Most of us probably would say No, but not because
agency matters more than experience.We would not
believe the machine could deliver the same experi-
ence – (no machine ever could) and someone might
even switch it off.Or we might want to bring happiness
to others,which we could not do through the machine.
And so on. Nozick’s is a flawed test and we can safely
continue to believe that all that ultimately matters are
the feelings that we and others experience.
Adaptation
Another objection is that humans adapt:some people
can be happy even when external circumstances are
harsh. People can adapt in part to poverty.According
to Sen, this might be used to justify leaving them in
poverty.But of course the corollary also holds:people
adapt to wealth and get limited extra pleasure from it.
So adaptation does not blunt the case for redistribu-
tion – the rich will largely adapt to the loss of income.
In fact happiness research provides by far the most
powerful evidence there is in favour of redistribu-
tion.Within any one country there is a sharply dimi-
nishing marginal utility of relative income.And across
countries there is a sharply diminishing marginal util-
ity of absolute income: this is the clearest argument
for Third World “aid” that I know.
However, reverting to adaptation, it cannot be right
to have a social philosophy which ignores it.It is one
of the most fundamental properties of all living
organisms.Why ignore it,especially when this has no
especially conservative implications? When it suits
him,Sen invokes subjective emotion.For example in
rich countries he focuses on relative rather than
absolute income, arguing rightly that people should
be able “to appear in public without shame”. This
involves an explicit appeal to people’s subjective
states.However,when it comes to adaptation,he ob-
jects. But, surely, we should be even-handed, and
base all policy on its impact on people’s feelings. If
some things are easier to adapt to than others, and
some, like mental illness, are harder to adapt to, this
is highly relevant to public policy.
Nanny state and laissez faire economics
Finally, there are some people who might accept the
greatest happiness principle as a private ethical guide
but reject its use for public policy.It is easy to see why
supporters of a minimal state should not want to base
government upon it.
As we know from welfare economics, if we take
tastes as given, private voluntary exchange will pro-
duce the most efficient possible outcome unless
there are economies of scale, information problems
or external effects (where one agent affects another
directly and not through voluntary exchange.) This
powerful theorem implies correctly that any effec-
tive society must rely heavily on the unfettered
choices of self-determining agents.
But the assumptions also underline where state activ-
ity is needed.These conditions include the huge vari-
ety of cases where agents affect others directly (e.g.,
through crime or advertising) or where public tastes
could be improved to the benefit of all (e.g., through
moral education). This raises the spectre of an over-
active state regulating much of our life.
But here we should immediately go back to psy-
chology and the causes of happiness. People do not
like regulation as such – it makes them miserable.
Almost certainly bureaucrats obsessed with objec-
tive standards already interfere in the name of
those standards beyond the level that is justified in
terms of happiness. But, equally true, there are
some areas where the state could manifestly do
more to promote a happy lifestyle. Let me end with
a few examples.Public policy implications
Taxation and redistribution
In almost any political philosophy, redistribution is
one role of the state. The greatest happiness princi-
ple bases the case for redistribution partly on the
diminishing marginal utility of income. If there were
no efficiency cost of redistribution, this fact would
argue in favour of total income equality. But there is
an efficiency cost, since taxes (spent on services) do
discourage work effort.
But happiness research puts work effort into a new
perspective. Individuals work partly in order to raise
their income relative to others. But it is impossible
for the average person to raise his income relative to
others.So some of the work effort is wasted.It is like
an arms race. Thus, if taxes somewhat discourage
work effort, they are orchestrating a desirable arms-
limitation agreement. They are reducing the unnec-
essary sacrifice of family life and social life that ex-
cessive work entails.
Existing knowledge shows this is a serious issue, but
does not offer a precise figure for policy use.So I am
not saying that taxes should be higher than they are
– but they should be higher than if you had not con-
sidered this point.
Expenditure on mental health
When it comes to expenditure, there is one obvious
area of shameful neglect. One in six Britons is cur-
rently a diagnosable case of clinical depression and/ or
chronic anxiety disorder. Only a quarter of these peo-
ple are in treatment.For most the only available treat-
ment is pills prescribed by a non-specialist GP.This is
in flagrant contravention of NICE Guidelines which
say these people should also be offered modern evi-
dence-based psychological therapies, which are at
least as effective as drugs.They are what the majority
of patients want, and, if they cannot have them, many
patients prefer to go untreated. This volume of
untreated suffering is especially scandalous when it
turns out that treating it would involve no net cost to
the Exchequer – due to the savings on incapacity ben-
efits (Layard, Clark, Knapp and Mayraz 2007).
So why does this situation persist? I believe it reflects a
deeply-rooted form of materialism or what one might
call “objectivism”– a belief that the subjective world is
too fuzzy for us to take it seriously. Yet the subjective
world is what we experience each moment of our lives.
In truth the severity of depression and anxiety states
can be measured quite accurately, and the best thera-
pists are as dedicated as physicians and surgeons (or
more so) to measuring the impact of their treatments.
Building character in childhood
It would of course be much better to prevent mental
illness than to have to treat it.This ought to be a ma-
jor role of our educational system – to implant the
seeds of a happy life and of one that brings happi-
ness to others.
Most schools pay too little attention to this. It is not
easy to teach but well-tested materials are becoming
available at an encouraging rate. (One example is
the Penn Resiliency Programme now being used in
three of our local authorities). Teachers should be
taught to use these materials,and in secondary schools
Personal Social and Health Education (PSHE) ought
to be a specialist subject in which teachers can spe-
cialise in their post-graduate certificate in education.
Parenting
Another obvious area where the state has to become
more involved is the quality of parenting.If bad par-
enting produces crime and bad behaviour – let alone
personal misery – the state must act at many levels.
Parenting should be taught in schools. Above all
people should recognize the huge responsibility in-
volved in having children well before they decide to
have their own. Then parenting classes should be
offered to parents around their first pregnancy, and
these should cover not only biology but also the
emotional side of child-rearing – including its impact
on the relations between the parents. And finally
there should be high quality services available when
parents run into trouble.There exist evidence-based
interventions which should be readily on offer. Here
as elsewhere, what is different from the past is that
the new interventions rely less on the few people of
great wisdom and more on the findings of science
which can be implemented by ordinary mortals.
Advertising and gambling
Finally I want to take two examples where tastes are
clearly affected by public policy. Advertising is clearly
meant to change our tastes,so we are entitled to ask,Is
the change for the better? Undoubtedly some advertis-
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ing provides valuable information. But a lot of adver-
tising makes us feel we need things we previously did-
n’t need. The advertiser may have only wanted us to
buy his brand rather than another. But the overall
effect is to make people want more.This means that we
are less contented with what we have.The most serious
effect is on children,who put parents under intolerable
pressure to buy the latest doll or the coolest make of
footwear. The waste is extraordinary, and children get
the idea that they need this vast array of spending just
to be themselves.That is the reason why Sweden bans
commercial advertising directed at children under
twelve.2 Every country should learn from this example.
Similarly in the case of gambling. Laissez faire eco-
nomics says, “If people are willing to pay, let them
spend their money as they want.” But the expansion
of gambling can so easily produce addicts. Under
existing gambling laws there are at least 150,000 gam-
bling addicts in this country, and this addiction
blights both them and their families.If gambling laws
are eased, some people might gain a little extra en-
joyment at the cost of increased misery for others. It
is hard to see how this could be justified.
Conclusion
We are at the beginning of a major revolution in pub-
lic values, reflecting two main forces. One of these is
our historical experience.Increasingly people realise
that ever-increasing affluence brings less enhanced
satisfaction than they expected.There is also a major
revulsion against many blinkered forms of manage-
rialism that appeal only to self-interest. People are
looking for something more in life – involving less
selfishness and more devotion to a common cause.
At the same time there is the new science of happi-
ness, which provides a more accurate account of
what makes people happy than the cruder forms of
elementary economic theory. It shows for example
that people who are mainly concerned with their
own welfare are less happy than those who are more
concerned with others. And it shows that these atti-
tudes can be affected by public policy.
This points the way for a revolution in political phi-
losophy. At present we have no coherent political
philosophy that inspires our society. Rampant indi-
vidualism has filled this vacuum and contributes to
alienation from the political process. But individual-
ism is inherently inconsistent. It appears to promote
the interest of individuals but it cannot do so, be-
cause the other individuals we would like to encoun-
ter are not individualistic.
Instead we need a political philosophy which is in-
trinsically defensible but also internally consistent.
Consistency means that,if people use the philosophy
in their individual lives, the result will be the society
which the philosophy advocates.The principle of the
greatest happiness satisfies this requirement.We want
a society where people desire to produce as much hap-
piness in the world as they can.If everyone thinks like
that, they will all end up happier. This is a consistent
philosophy.
It would, of course, involve reversing a trend, and
many people assume that trends go on forever.That
is not how I read history. In many areas I see some-
thing more like cycles. For example we can observe
clear ups-and-downs in the extent to which social
responsibility has been stressed in our national life-
style. In the early seventeenth century it was de ri-
gueur; while the eighteenth century was more easy-
going. The nineteenth century saw increased social
responsibility;while the last forty years have seen in-
creasing individualism. It is quite possible that the
current trend will be reversed again in the coming
decades, as it was two hundred years ago.
We do not need a return to Victorian values,some of
which were pretty gloomy.Instead,we need a philos-
ophy which fully values happiness and enjoyment,
but at the same time enjoins us to strive for the hap-
piness of others. And that is the philosophy of the
Greatest Happiness.
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